Introduction—The Biggest Deal Ever by DeMott, Deborah A.
Duke Law Journal
VOLUME 1989 FEBRUARY NUMBER 1
SYMPOSIUM
FUNDAMENTAL CORPORATE CHANGES:
CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND LEGAL
RESPONSES
INTRODUCTION-THE BIGGEST DEAL-EVER
DEBORAH A. DEMoTr*
Twenty-five billion dollars buys a lot of Oreos, Winstons, and Milk-
Bone dog biscuits. In early December 1988, Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts
& Co. (KKR), a firm specializing in leveraged buyouts, won the contest
for ownership and control of RJR Nabisco, Inc., a victory that resulted
in the largest corporate control transaction in the United States to date.
When the LBO was completed in 1989, the nineteenth-largest industrial
company in the United States had increased its indebtedness from $5
billion to $20.1 billion. RJR Nabisco's former public shareholders re-
ceived, in addition to cash, a package of preferred stock and notes con-
vertible into common stock, but immediate control of the company, and
its equity, passed to KKR in exchange for a $1.5 billion equity invest-
ment. KKR itself provided an estimated 1% of this equity investment,
or $15 million, and a pool of funds that KKR gathered from institutional
investors provided the remainder.
The RIR Nabisco transaction illustrates the significance of the is-
sues that the authors in this symposium address. Beyond the transac-
tion's magnitude, its structure and origins demonstrate the increasing
obsolescence of long-held assumptions about the finance and governance
of large corporations in the United States. For example, many have as-
sumed that the structure of very large companies inevitably involves a
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division between ownership interests, held by public shareholders, and
management, composed of individual managers who typically invest little
of their own wealth in company shares. In addition, many have believed
that very large corporations are immune to the risk of a takeover simply
because of the massive amounts of money required, even if a good
number of a corporation's shareholders might avidly accept an offer to
sell their shares at a premium over market price. Indeed, many have
thought that even large corporations with a predominance of institu-
tional shareholders enjoy such immunity.' Many large corporations with
solid earnings have long been able to finance most of their needs for addi-
tional capital out of retained earnings and thus to operate independently
of other equity capital sources like public trading markets. Moreover,
such corporations have used little long-term debt to finance operations.
As a result of the interrelationship among these factors, certain large cor-
porations have seemed to resemble non-ownership institutions (like uni-
versities, perhaps) more than smaller public corporations in which equity
owners' interests and claims seem more immediate.
The soundness of these long-held assumptions has been challenged
by a series of recent transactions, culminating in the LBO for RJR
Nabisco. This Introduction will develop the history of the RJR Nabisco
acquisition and examine its impact, along with the impact of similar
transactions, on these assumptions.
On October 19, 1988, F. Ross Johnson, the president and chief exec-
utive officer of RJR Nabisco, took the outside directors of his company's
board out to dinner in Atlanta on the night before a board meeting. Mr.
Johnson told the outside directors that he was considering leading an
LBO for the company because the price of its stock had, despite his two-
year effort to increase the stock's value by restructuring the company,
continued to lag.2 The directors were stunned but did not object to Mr.
Johnson's proposal: "We came to the conclusion that shareholders
would be best served by a short-term gain," one of the directors recalled
later.3 At the time of Mr. Johnson's proposal, RJR Nabisco was trading
around $55 per share,4 and thus the stock market's implicit price tag on
the entire company was around $13 billion.
1. See generally L. LOWENSTmIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM
GAIN AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 57-63 (1988) (describing the institutionalization of stock
markets and its consequences).
2. Helyar & Burrough, Nobody's Took RJR Nabisco Board Asserts Independence in Buy-Out
Decisions, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1988, at Al, col. 1, col. 1.
3. Id. (quoting outside director).
4. Sterngold, Managers'Huge Stake in a Private Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1988, at DI,
col. 3, DS, col. 2.
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Although Mr. Johnson's formal proposal did not emerge until a few
weeks later, RJR Nabisco promptly issued a press release announcing
that members of its senior management, in association with Shearson
Lehman Hutton, would offer $17 billion,5 or $75 per share, to buy out
RJR Nabisco's shareholders. This announcement promptly led to a
steep drop in the price of the company's outstanding bonds. 6 As a senior
bond trader at Drexel Burnham Lambert (which will shortly enter the
story in a major role) said, "Bondholders suffer from those sorts of trans-
actions .... It is clear that the industrial bond market cannot benefit
from this deal."'7 Indeed, institutional holders of RJR Nabisco bonds
eventually sued, alleging that, among other things, the company ne-
glected to disclose that discussions about a prospective LBO had already
occurred when the holders bought their bonds in spring 1988.8
On October 25, 6 days after the RJR Nabisco directors' dinner with
Mr. Johnson, KKR announced a competing offer at $90 per share for a
total of $20.3 billion, subject to the approval of RJR Nabisco's board.9
KKR is the leading LBO specialist in the United States. As a result of its
prior transactions-all coupling large amounts of debt (principally from
bank loans and high-yield debt securities) with small pools of equity col-
lected from institutions-KKR has become an enormous industrial hold-
ing company with nearly as much annual revenue as the General Electric
Company.10 Formed only in 1976, KKR nevertheless has many firsts to
its credit. In 1979, it arranged the first LBO of a large company listed on
the New York Stock Exchange1" and, in 1984, the first billion dollar
5. Sterngold, Shearson Risk Remwds on RJR Nabisco, N.Y. Tines, Oct. 22, 1988, at 33, col.
3, col. 3; Sterngold, Buyout Specialist Bids $2a 3 Billion for RJR Nabiscm N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1988,
at Al, col. 6, col. 6 [hereinafter Buyout Specialist Bids $2a23 Billion for RJR Nabisco ].
6. Gilpin, Bid for RJR Nabisco Jolts Bonds, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, at D11, col. 1, col. 1.
7. Id (quoting senior bond trader).
8. Wallace, Nabisco Sued over Bond Drop, N.Y. Tmes, Nov. 18, 1988, at D3, col. 4, col. 4.
As it happens, KKR had discussed a buyout with Mr. Johnson in September 1987, thirteen
months before Johnson's own proposal surfaced. Sterngold, The Nabisco Battle's Key Moment, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at D15, col 1, col 2, cf In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-
1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,703 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (KKR
was purportedly earlier rebuffed in an effort to entice management to join in an LBO). In a court
filing, Mr. Johnson acknowledged that six months prior to his announced buyout proposal, a large
shareholder approached him with an offer to buy the company. Durham (N.C.) Morning Herald,
Jan. 22, 1989, at BI, col 3, col. 3. The shareholder, C.D. Spangler, Jr., owned less than 1% of RJR
Nabisco's stock through family-held corporations. Id. at BI, col. 1. Mr. Spangler, the president of
the University of North Carolina, is also a director of Jefferson Pilot Corp., an insurance company
that is suing RJR Nabisco over the devaluation of RJR Nabisco bonds it purchased prior to the
LBO. Id at Bl, cols. 3-4.
9. Buyout Specialist Bids $2123 Billion for RJR Nabisco, supra note 5, at A1, col. 6.
10. Id
11. Id at D6, col. 6.
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buyout. 12 In 1985, KKR began the $6.4 billion LBO of Beatrice Compa-
nies, a transaction of record size at the time.13  KKR reportedly has
about $5 billion available to invest as equity in such transactions, in addi-
tion to its own capital.1 4 In fact, KKR generally invests in only 1% of
the equity in its deals from its own capital.
Such large LBOs have become more feasible since banks have devel-
oped the practice, when committing themselves to a large loan, of selling
smaller pieces of the loan to other financial institutions. Indeed, about
9% of all U.S. bank loans made to corporate borrowers in 1987 were
connected to LBOs. 15 In addition, expansion of the market for high-
yield debt securities (a.k.a. "junk bonds") enhanced the potential for
large LBO transactions. For example, KKR financed its offer for RJR
Nabisco in part through the issuance of junk bonds to be sold by Merrill
Lynch & Co. and Drexel Burnham Lambert. Many have credited the
latter firm with developing the market for high-yield debt securities; 16
Drexel Burnham, however, was also the subject of a January 1989 federal
information that alleged various violations of the federal securities laws,
none involving the RJR Nabisco transaction. 17
KKR, Mr. Johnson, and Shearson Lehman discussed the possibility
of a joint or combined bid, but they reached no agreement. Neither
KKR nor Shearson was willing to surrender control in any joint deal or
'to share control on an equal basis.'8 Although KKR and Shearson re-
portedly later reached an agreement in principle for a joint bid, the agree-
ment collapsed when the firms' investment banks failed to agree on
which bank would manage the debt securities offerings necessary to fi-
nance the bid.19 In any event, as a consequence of the participants' fail-
ure to make a joint bid, the KKR proposal came to the directors of RJR
Nabisco without incumbent management's endorsement or participa-
12. Id.
13. Id. The Beatrice transaction produced an antitrust obstacle to the RJR Nabisco deal,
which was eventually resolved. Through Beatrice, KKR controlled brands that competed with R JR
Nabisco brands. KKR announced at the end of January that it had reached an agreement with the
staff of the Federal Trade Commission to sell either RJR or Beatrice brands to eliminate overlaps,
specifically those in Chinese foods, soy sauce, packaged nuts, and ketchup. Smith & Waldman, Buy-
Out ofRJR Proceeds as Financing Is Expanded, Antitrust Pact Is Reached, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1989,
at A3, col. 2, cols. 2-3.
14. Buyout Specialist Bids $20.3 Billion for RJR Nabisco, supra note 5, at D6, col. 6.
15. Bartlett, A Corporate Milestone, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 4, D6, col. 5.
16. See, eg., C. BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL 344-50 (1988).
17. See Cohen, Criminal Charges Filed Against Drexel Indicate Alleged Wrongdoing by Milken,
Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 1989, at A4, col. 2.
18. Sterngold, Joint Deal for Nabisco Is Rejected, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1988, at D1, col. 6, col.
6.
19. Burrough & Helyar, RJR May GetA Third Offer. Topping Others, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1988,
at A3, col. 1, col. 2.
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tion.20 This circumstance-that the KKR bid appeared to be at least
semi-hostile-troubled some investors in KKR's equity pool. The head
of one potential investor, a state pension fund, characterized the KKR
offer as "a hostile friendly deal. ' '21 In fact, two of the investors in the
KKR equity pool were pension funds of companies that, like RJR
Nabisco, have headquarters in Atlanta.22 Nevertheless, on November 2,
Charles Hugel, an outside director serving as chairman of RJR Nabisco,
said that the board was "interested in receiving proposals... from all
credible parties wishing to present such proposals." 23
On November 4, a third group announced that it was considering
making an offer. Led by Forstmann, Little & Company, another LBO
specialist, and Goldman, Sachs & Company, a large investment bank, the
group also included three consumer goods companies. 24 This group's an-
nouncement provoked controversy on two different scores. First, senior
partners in Forstmann, Little had failed to reach terms on a bid during
earlier discussions with Mr. Johnson's management group but, according
to the management group, had promised not to bid for RJR Nabisco on
their own.25 Second, a special committee of RJR Nabisco directors, set
up to evaluate all offers, had told KKR and Mr. Johnson's group that it
wanted no "pre-selling" of the corporation's assets before the committee
determined whether to support a buyout.26 The inclusion of the con-
sumer products companies in the Forstmann, Little group, however, sug-
gested that pre-selling might be occurring.27 This issue fell away when
the Forstmann, Little group announced, less than two weeks later, that it
had decided not to submit a bid.28
The deal that Mr. Johnson and a small number of other senior exec-
utives had made with their financial partners also provoked controversy
in early November. This deal promised to give the small management
group 8.5% of RJR Nabisco's equity, a stake that could rise to 19.5% if
the company met specified financial goals.29 In addition, the deal gave
20. Sterngold, supra note 18, at DI, col. 6.
21. Wallace, Several Giant Penson Funds Investing in Offer for Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31,
1988, at Al, col. 5, D5, col. 1.
22. Id at Al, col. 5 (Coca-Cola Company and Georgia-Pacific Corporation).
23. RJR Nabisco Stock Surge N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1988, at 134, col. 4, col. 4.
24. Sterngold, Nabisco Officials Weigh Suit to Block a Bid, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1988, at D1,
col. 3, col. 3.
25. Id at DI, col. 4.
26. Id. at D14, col. 4. "Pre-sold" assets are those committed to purchasers before a putative
seller acquires the entity that owns the assets.
27. Id.
28. Sterngold, Forstmann Declines to Bid on RJR Nabisco. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1988, at Dl,
col. 3.
29. Sterngold, supra note 4, at D5, col. 3.
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the group veto power over board decisions in the post-buy out company
and promised group members a combined annual compensation of at
least $18 million, plus at least $20 million in bonuses.30 In an SEC filing,
RJR Nabisco disclosed that Mr. Johnson and nineteen other senior exec-
utives would receive "golden parachutes" (or severance payments contin-
gent on a sale of the company) worth $52.5 million.31 After a newspaper
disclosed the terms of this deal, Mr. Johnson wrote to RJR Nabisco's
chairman, Mr. Hugel, stating that he had asked his lawyers to "analyze
ways in which this stock could be distributed to our employees. ' 32 In
this same letter, Mr. Johnson argued that his group's compensation and
equity-share percentages were typical for management buyout agree-
ments.33 Reportedly, however, one potential financial partner in Mr.
Johnson's group, Salomon Brothers, refused to agree to these terms. 34
On November 8, RJR Nabisco's special committee promulgated five
pages of formal guidelines for the disposition of the company and its
assets. These guidelines contemplated a single round of bidding, to con-
clude on November 18.35 The committee was eager to structure the
transaction to leave RJR Nabisco's shareholders a substantial equity
stake in the post-buyout company.36 The committee also announced that
it would favor only a bidder that could do something for RJR Nabisco's
shareholders beyond what the company itself could do-like providing a
large initial cash payment rather than simply selling off food interests. 37
KKR's success in obtaining sufficient information from RJR
Nabisco's managers aided its preparation of a bid. A few days prior to
the November 18 deadline, Nabisco's chief told KKR that he wanted to
provide more information than other managers had furnished about the
subsidiary's operations. .KKR's head lawyer subsequently sent the spe-
cial committee a letter on behalf of KKR complaining that some of RJR
Nabisco's managers were apparently withholding information. 38 The
committee promised to remedy the problem. 39 Some of the committee's
own financial advisors similarly complained that at the initial stages even
they had not received adequate information to evaluate bids.4°
30. Sterngold, supra note 24, at D14, col. 4.
31. Sterngold, RJR Nabisco Discloses Guidelines for Its Buyout, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1988, at
D6, col. 3, cols. 3-4.
32. Sterngold, supra note 4, at DS, col. 4.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Sterngold, supra note 31, at D6, col. 3, cols. 3-4.
36. Id. at D6, col. 4.
37. Id.
38. Sterngold, supra note 8, at D15, cols. 2-3.
39. Id.
40. Id. at D15, col. 3.
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On November 18, both the management group and KKR submitted
bids. The board's special committee, however, extended the bidding
deadline by ten days-to November 29-permitting a third bidding
group, led by First Boston Corporation, to develop a firm offer.41 On
November 18, the highest bid was the management group's bid at $100
per share, for a total of $22.7 billion.42 KKR's bid was lower at $21.3
billion.43 The First Boston deal, which would have yielded a price of
between $23.8 and $26.8 billion, contemplated an installment sale of RJR
Nabisco's food businesses to the investment group by the end of 1988, to
achieve tax savings. 44 Since Congress had in 1988 repealed the tax provi-
sions that favored installment sales (effective January 1, 1989), closing
this aspect of the First Boston deal by the end of 1988 was crucial. Fur-
ther, the installment sale would result in a $13 billion installment note,
which the investment group, as the note's holder, would need to "mone-
tize" (turn into cash). To date, no one had achieved such a feat with a
note of comparable size.45
Finally, on November 30, after much confusion on November 29,
KKR claimed victory. Its winning bid offered cash and securities worth
$109 for each of RJR Nabisco's 227 million common shares and $108 for
each of the company's 1.3 million outstanding preferred shares, totaling
$24.88 billion.46 Although the management group claimed that its bid
had a higher total value, $25.42 billion (or $112 per share), RJR Nabisco
issued a statement that its advisors assessed the two offers as "substan-
tially equivalent." 47 The committee of outside directors recommended
acceptance of the KKR offer, and the full board (apparently without Mr.
Johnson's participation) voted in favor of the committee's recommenda-
tion.43 The First Boston group dropped out of the bidding as a result of
uncertainties about the bank financing for its bid.49
The management group subsequently complained that the bidding
process had been unfair. The process had become somewhat confused
around midnight, November 30, when the management group learned
that the board committee was working out a deal with KKR. At the 5
41. Sterngold, Tax Hurdles Seen on Bid to RJR Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1988, at D1,
col. 6, col. 6.
42. 1
43. Sterngold, supra note 28, at D15, col. 1.
44. Id. at D1, col. 6, D8, cols. 3-4.
45. Id at D8, col. 4.
46. Stemgold, RJR Nabisco Suitor Claims $24.88 Billion Victory, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1988, at
Al, col. 2, col. 2, D8, col. 1.
47. Id. at D8, col. 1.
48. Id.
49. Id. at D8, col. 2.
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p.m. bidding deadline on November 23, KKR had submitted a bid of
$106 per share, topping the management group's bid of $101 per share.5°
Early in the morning of November 30, the management group offered a
new bid of $108 per share and demanded that it be considered.5 1 By
midday on November 30, the board committee told both groups that
they had a few minutes to formulate a final proposal.5 2 KKR then raised
its bid to $108 per share, and the management group raised its bid to
$112 per share. The committee invited KKR to raise its bid further,
which it did, to $109 per share.5 3 KKR then gave the committee's advi-
sors a signed merger agreement and stated that they had half an hour to
sign on.54 In forty minutes, the committee's advisors came back with the
chairman's signature.55
Despite the definiteness of the amounts given above, each proposal
consisted of a complex mixture of cash and securities, so that differing
valuations of each proposal were inevitable. The management group of-
fered per share $84 in cash, preferred stock valued at $24, and stock in
the post-buyout company valued at $4 (and which would total 15% of
RJR Nabisco's equity).56 KKR offered $81 in cash per share, preferred
stock valued at $18 with dividends to be paid with additional shares of
preferred stock, plus convertible debentures that it valued at $10. 57 After
four years, the debentures would be convertible to 25% of the post-
buyout company's equity.58
The committee ultimately recommended the KKR proposal on the
basis of nonfinancial factors. KKR promised to sell neither the tobacco
operations nor much of .the food business, whereas the management
group had planned to sell all the food operations.5 9 KKR also promised
to try to maintain employees' benefits, even if it sold particular business
operations. 6° Under KKR's proposal, moreover, current shareholders
would ultimately receive more equity in the post-buyout company.
Three weeks after KKR's victory, the firm's head, Henry Kravis,
flew to Tokyo. The financing of KKR's bid called for $13.75 billion to be
50. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) r 94,194, at 91,704 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
51. Id at 91,706.
52. See id.
53. Id at 91,707.
54. See id
55. Sterngold, supra note 46, at D8, col. 4.
56. In re RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,706.
57. Id at 91,706-07.
58. Id. at 91,705.
59. See id. at 91,708.
60. Helyar & Burrough, How Underdog KKR Won RJR Nabisco Without Highest Bid, Wall St.
J., Dec. 2, 1988, at Al, col. 6, All, col. 6.
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raised from banks, and Mr. Kravis asked Japanese banks to provide $5.5
billion; some observers saw these banks' participation as crucial to the
deal.61 In Tokyo, Mr. Kravis also spoke with potential Japanese custom-
ers interested in purchasing junk bonds that were expected to form part
of the deal.62 In addition to Japanese financiers' assistance, the original
deal also required $5 billion in short-term loans, or "bridge financing,"
with $3.5 billion coming from Drexel Burnham Lambert and $1.5 billion
from Merrill Lynch.63 KKR's plan called for refinancing these bridge
loans within a year from the proceeds of the sale of $2 billion in zero-
coupon high-yield bonds and $3 billion in interest-paying high-yield
bonds.64
KKR's efforts to recruit banks succeeded. By January 17, 1989, the
firm reported that its bank syndicate had received commitments for $14
billion,65 an indication that banks had even oversubscribed. Although
analysts were optimistic that KKR could also place the necessary junk
bonds, they noted that junk debt financing of other large deals would
require the market to absorb $12 billion of such debt in early 1989, possi-
bly leading to a rise in junk bond interest rates. In mid-January, Drexel
increased the amount of its planned junk bond sale from $3.5 billion to
$4 billion.66 By January 31, however, KKR's need for a bridge loan was
eliminated: Drexel had decided that it would be able to sell $5 billion
rather than $3 billion in short-term notes, to be refinanced in the spring
with a sale of long-term junk bonds.67 One novel feature of Drexel's note
sales, perhaps responsible in part for their success, was KKR's payment
of cash fees (analogous to "points" paid to a mortgage lender), along
with equity stakes in RJR Nabisco, to note buyers. KKR funded these
novel cash fees partially from RJR Nabisco's assets, and Drexel funded
the rest.68
61. Cowan, Banks to Get Steep Fees in Nabisco Deal N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1988, at D5, col. 4.
62. Sanger, Kohlberg Kravis Seeks Japan's Help on Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1988, at D2,
col. 5, col. 5.
63. Cowan, Efforts Begin to Rebuild Nabisco's Moral N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1988, at 35, col. 3,
37, col. 4.
64. IU
65. Smith, RJR Buy-Out by KKR Clears Hurdle as $14 Billion of Bank Loans Are Set, Wall St.
J., Jan. 18, 1989, at A3, col. 1, col. 1.
66. Id at A3, col. 2.
67. Smith & Waldman, supra note 13, at A3, col. 2.
68. Although such fees are not unusual in private placements of bonds, fees for buying junior
notes were novel to this transaction. See Smith, How Drexel Overcame Big Hurdles in Selling Junk
Issue for KKR. Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1989, at A1, col. 7, A7, col. 3. Like the commitment fees paid to
bank lenders, see infra text accompanying note 75, the junior note buyers' fee percentage scaled
upward with the amount of debt purchased. Id.
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As a result of its magnitude, KKR's buyout of RJR Nabisco will
naturally generate large fees for the financial institutions involved in the
LBO and related transactions. KKR will receive a $75 million fee for
arranging the transaction, a 1.5% management fee for the use of its
buyout funds, and 20% of any profit that each pool of funds garners
from a successful LBO.6 9 Although the $75 million fee is the largest that
KKR has received to date for a single transaction, the amount only
slightly exceeds fees that KKR has received for considerably smaller
transactions in the past.70 As of the end of January, Drexel was to re-
ceive $201.9 million and Merrill Lynch $84.4 million for arranging the
requisite junk bond financing.71 Each investment bank also expected $25
million in advisory fees.72 RJR Nabisco disclosed that it would pay $14
million to each of the two investment firms-Dillon Read & Company
and Lazard Freres & Company-that advised the board.73 The law firms
involved in the transaction have also earned record-setting fees.74 Fi-
nally, banks that agree to help finance LBOs typically receive commit-
ment fees in a percentage of the loan amount, a percentage that increases
with the amount of the loan. The smallest loan amount for the RJR
Nabisco transaction ($100 million) carried a fee of 1.5%, and the largest
lenders were reportedly to receive as much as 3.25% in fees.75
Numbers aside,76 the most remarkable aspect of this transaction is
that the management-sponsored deal lost, even after the management
group made a bid economically equivalent (and perhaps superior) to
69. Smith, KKR to Receive $75 Million Fee in RJR Buy-Out Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1989, at A6,
col. 1, col. 1.
70. Id. For example, in 1986, KKR received a fee of $45 million for the S6.2 billion manage-
ment buyout of Beatrice Companies. I&; see also Williams, King of the Buyouts Kohlberg Kravis
Helps Alter Corporate U.S., Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at Al, col. 4.
71. Smith & Waldman, supra note 13, at A12, col. 2.
72. Id.
73. Sterngold, Talking Deals A Feeding Frenzy on Nabisco Fees, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at
D2, col. 1, col. 1.
74. Law firms involved in the RJR deal will receive more than $60 million in fees. Sontag, $60
Million in Fees; Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 2, col. 1. The transaction used the services of 200
lawyers from at least 10 law firms, who represented bidders, investors, and sundry banks, and report-
edly billed at premium rates for furnishing round-the-clock service in a high-pressure atmosphere.
Id. Transactions in the wake of the LBO, like the formal tender offer to RJR Nabisco shareholders
and asset sales, along with litigation, will also require lawyers' services. Id.; see also For Further
Detail-, See Carton No. 587, Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1989, at BI, col. 1, col. 1 (reporting that over the
Christmas holiday, KKR employed 150 attorneys from Latham & Watkins, Los Angeles, to compile
680 cartons of documents in response to an FTC request for information, which required a DC-9 jet
for shipping data to Washington).
75. Cowan, supra note 61, at D5, col. 4.
76. Economists predicted that completing the transaction, which entailed the transfer to KKR
of S18.9 billion from banks as well as KKR's purchase of 74% of RIR Nabisco's shares, would cause
a "blip" in U.S. money supply statistics. Anders, RJR Finale Will Send Money Coursing Wall St. L,
Feb. 9, 1989, at Cl, col. 3.
(Vol. 1989:1
THE BIGGEST DEAL
KKR's.77 Such an outcome stands out because management groups ini-
tiating buyout proposals typically defeat outsiders' competing propos-
als.78 Why is this? And why did the RJR Nabisco contest turn out
differently?
Several factors explain management groups' frequent success over
competing bidders. If a management group initiates a buyout transac-
tion, it enjoys advantages that flow to any initial bidder: such a bidder
chooses the time for the transaction and structures an initial proposal to
which other prospective bidders must respond. Moreover, events often
move quickly, limiting the likelihood that other prospective bidders will
make competing proposals at all. Management groups also enjoy unique
advantages. As the RJR Nabisco experience demonstrates, these groups
have unlimited access to nonpublic information on their company,
whereas outside bidders have circumscribed access to such information
at best, and often face serious initial difficulty in getting any access. 79
Uncertainty thus might cause outside bidders to systematically discount
the top price they are willing to pay for a target, and corporate manage-
ment can exacerbate such uncertainty by sharply limiting the outside bid-
der's access to nonpublic information.
Senior management's often considerable rapport with the corpora-
tion's directors also provides an advantage for management groups. If
control of the corporation is to shift, all things being equal, even outside
directors would prefer a victory by a management-backed group. Cur-
rent managers seem more likely than total "outsiders" to be familiar with
corporate operations and sympathetic to the interests of nonmanagement
employees and others with long-standing interests in the corporation's
stability.
Several factors explain why the contest for RJR Nabisco turned out
differently for the management group. Although management's first of-
fer-75 per share-represented a 36% premium over the then-current
RJR Nabisco market price, it soon appeared unduly low. Within four
days, KKR had offered $90 per share, and soon thereafter RJR
Nabisco's directors gained access to studies setting the value of the com-
pany, if its component businesses were sold separately, at prices in excess
77. Cf In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig.. [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) r 94,194, at 91,713 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (holding that directors' preference for KKR
proposal was not "so beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment as to raise an inference of bad
faith").
78. Cowan, Losers Get Some Spoils in Fight for RJR Nabisco, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at
D14, col. 5, col. 5.
79. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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of $90 per share. 0 KKR's ability to make a credible bid at $90, given
RJR Nabisco's size, meant that it could raise sufficient financing for a
$20.4 billion deal. The management group, however, might have under-
estimated its likely competitors' ability to raise serious money8' on short
notice. The management group's posture became even more controver-
sial when a newspaper article revealed the generosity of Shearson Leh-
man's financial arrangements, potentially producing $100 million in
profits for each management participant.8 2 As other bidders joined the
fray, moreover, the contest became lengthier and pricier. In the end,
KKR's proposal, compared with the final management-backed proposal,
was more generous to RJR Nabisco's shareholders, eventually giving
them 25% of the company's equity. In addition to shareholder benefits,
the KKR deal was kinder to the company's nonmanagement employees.
Whereas the management group announced plans to sell off all of RJR
Nabisco's food businesses, KKR stated that it planned to retain most of
the food businesses and all of the tobacco operations. Further, unlike the
management group, KKR explicitly agreed to guarantee nonmanage-
ment employees' fringe benefits through 1991, notwithstanding any sale
of business operations. 83
Another factor that perhaps contributed to the demise of manage-
ment's offer was the involvement of F. Ross Johnson himself, a person
unpopular in many circles in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Three
years prior to the buyout, the R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company had
merged with Nabisco. 84 Mr. Johnson, who came from Nabisco, decided
that the company should.move its headquarters from Winston-Salem to
Atlanta, describing Winston-Salem as unduly "bucolic" for a cosmopoli-
tan enterprise like RJR.Nabisco.85 In Winston-Salem, however, succes-
sive generations of people had worked in Reynolds's tobacco operations
and, because of the company's generous stock purchase program for its
employees, individual residents and local institutions of that "bucolic"
place owned about $2.5 billion worth of RJR Nabisco stock at the time
80. Sterngold, Nabisco Battle Redefines Directors'Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1988, at A I, col. 2,
D5, cols. 1-2.
81. Lawyers and support staffs working on such large transactions seem to have problems han-
dling the numbers involved. The lawyer for one RJR Nabisco bidder reported: "As we kept typing
letters, the last three zeros occasionally dropped out... [p]eople were not used to typing billions."
Sontag, LBOs Put New Focus on the Bar, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 19, 1988, at 1, col. 4, 20, col. 3 (quoting
First Boston's attorney).
82. Sterngold, supra note 80, at D5, col. 2.
83. Id. at D5, col. 6.
84. Sterngold, supra note 4, at DS, col. 1.
85. See All Things Considered: Winston-Salem (NPR broadcast, Dec. 12, 1988) (tape on file
with author).
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of the buyout.86 Winston-Salem families had handed down the stock for
generations, like heirlooms or homesteads, exhibiting an unusually emo-
tional, personalized tie to the company. 87 Winston-Salem, moreover, has
been a quintessential "company town" for over one hundred years; in
1988, 15,000 of its residents still worked for RJR Nabisco. Even after
KKR's assurances reduced local fears of job losses, employee-stockhold-
ers resented the large tax obligations they would incur when they sold
their shares. Although Mr. Johnson initiated the events leading to the
sale that made many employee-stockholders wealthy, they continued to
speak of him in highly unfavorable terms. 88 As one tobacco Worker, in-
terviewed by National Public Radio, said of Mr. Johnson's era of man-
agement: "it's not a home town crowd any more."8 9 Many Winston-
Salem residents remain ambivalent at best about the LBO. The irrepara-
ble change to long-settled local practices, coupled with the widespread
perception that the initial management bid was an attempt to buy the
company on the cheap,9° outweighed (or at least accompanied) residents'
satisfaction with their enhanced individual wealth. 91
Indeed, Delaware's chancery court92 eventually considered the pos-
sibility that RJR Nabisco's directors endorsed the KKR proposal in or-
der to repudiate Mr. Johnson publicly. Actions brought on behalf of
RYR Nabisco's shareholders challenged the directors' decision to accept
the KKR proposal, after receiving substantially equivalent bids, rather
than again asking the contestants if they wished to increase their bids. 93
The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the directors' special
committee chose KKR in order to repudiate Mr. Johnson and thereby
publicly disassociate themselves from the harsh criticism evoked by the
management proposal.94 The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a
86. 1d
87. Id.
88. Id. (one employee described Johnson's initial bid as an attempt to "steal the company").
89. I&
90. During the buyout contest, the following song, created by a local radio station's morning
disc jockeys and sung to the tune of Santa Claus Is Coming to Town, proved popular:
You better watch out,
You better pay heed,
We're all going to be the victims of greed,
F. Ross Johnson's not coming to town.
Id.
91. In the same vein, a local journalist observed: "We have seen the future and didn't even get
its license number." The RJR Shuffle, The Independent (Durham, N.C.), Dec. 16, 1988, at 3, col. 2,
col. 3.
92. Despite strong ties to North Carolina, RJR Nabisco is a Delaware corporation.
93. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) r 94,194, at 91,700 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
94. Id. at 91,702, 91,710-13.
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preliminary injunction. In light of evidence that the committee members
and directors acted in good faith, the court held that the plaintiffs would
be unlikely to establish that the special committee's action showed an
improper motivation that worked in KKR's favor.95 The court observed,
however, that the alleged motivations, if established, would disqualify the
directors' decision from protection under the business judgment rule. In
that case, the directors would have pursued the transaction for a reason
unrelated to the corporation's best interests, even though the directors
themselves did not benefit financially from opposing the corporation's
interests. As the court noted, "[g]reed is not the only human emotion
that can pull one from the path of propriety; so might hatred, lust, envy,
revenge or, as it is here alleged, shame or pride."'96
One action that had a substantial effect on the transaction's outcome
was the directors' decision to disclose Mr. Johnson's proposal to the pub-
lic on October 20.97 Early disclosure enhanced the likelihood that com-
peting bids would be made; indeed, KKR announced its first offer five
days after RJR Nabisco issued a press release announcing that the man-
agement group would offer $75 per share.98 Delaware law probably did
not require disclosure at that point: Delaware courts have rejected share-
holders' challenges to LBOs that were not publicly announced until after
the directors and the acquiring entities had signed merger agreements. 99
For example, in In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litigation, the
Court of Chancery denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction
to prohibit the closing of a public tender offer that was the first move in a
two-step LBO of Fort Howard. 10 A special committee of Fort How-
ard's directors had signed a merger agreement with the financial partner
in the LBO without conducting an auction of any sort, public or pri-
vate.101 The merger agreement, however, contained provisions permit-
ting the committee, during a period of thirty business days following the
deal's public announcement, to negotiate with or provide information to
any other potential acquirer102 One distinction between the Fort How-
ard and RJR Nabisco LBOs is the relative magnitude of the two transac-
tions: the Fort Howard LBO carried a price of $3.7 billion, 0 3 not an
95. I& at 91,703, 91,710-14.
96. Id, at 91,711.
97. See Helyar, RJR Nabisco Buy-Out Would Fit the Pattern of a Restless Chief, Wall St. J.,
Oct. 21, 1988, at Al, col. 6, col. 6.
98. See Buyout Specialist Bids $20.3 Billion for RJR Nabisco, supra note 5, at Al, col. 6.
99. See, eg., In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 9991, slip op. (Del. Ch., Aug. 8,
1988) (Westlaw, 1988 WL 83147).
100. Id., slip op. at 52.
101. Id., slip op. at 21.
102. See id, slip op. at 19.
103. Id., slip op. at 3.
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insubstantial amount by most measures, but one dwarfed by the $25 bil-
lion price of the RJR Nabisco LBO. Even though the Delaware cases to
date do not require directors to conduct an auction in response to a pro-
posal for such a large transaction, the determination whether to pursue
the auction route seems well within the range of decisions protected by
the business judgment rule.
Thus, the special committees' disclosure of the management bid, the
price disparity between initial bids, and, arguably, Mr. Johnson's local
unpopularity led to the unusual result of a management group losing an
auction for a company, even when that group's bid was substantially
equivalent to the competitor's bid.
Another startling fact about the RJR Nabisco transaction, along
with others like it, is the enormous discrepancy between the company's
v&lue as realized in the LBO and its value as reflected in the price of
shares traded on the New York Stock Exchange prior to the announce-
ment of management's buyout proposal. How can one best explain this
discrepancy in value? Given RJR Nabisco's size, no one factor is likely
to suffice. Some observers took management's proposal as an admission
that the merger three years earlier between RJR, a tobacco company,
and Nabisco, a food company, had failed to produce its expected return
for shareholders. 104 To be sure, the operational relationships between
manufacturing and selling tobacco, on the one hand, and food products,
on the other, are not obvious. However, in light of KKR's apparent will-
ingness to retain all of the company's tobacco operations and most of its
food businesses, one would be mistaken to attribute much of the incre-
mental value realized by this transaction to an expected disaggregation of
mismatched operations.'05 Likewise, in evaluating competing LBO pro-
posals, RJR Nabisco's directors were appalled at the extent and cost of
incumbent management's perquisites, including lodgings in Palm
Springs, California, and a large fleet of jets referred to internally as the
"RJR Air Force."106 However excessive these expenditures might ap-
pear, the opportunity to eliminate them does not add up to a $12 billion
premium.
Other types of savings may provide a stronger explanation. KKR
disclosed internal RJR Nabisco projections, obtained during the contest,
104. See, e.g., Sterngold, supra note 4, at D5, col. I ("In effect, Mr. Johnson was admitting that
the merger ... failed to produce the expected return for shareholders.").
105. Another possibility is that the stock of a company with a track record of unsuccessful
acquisitions trades at a discount from the company's asset value, in part because investors believe
that the company's management will continue to use its earnings or other funds to make unsuccess-
ful investments. An LBO can "capture" this discount. For a full explication of this argument, see
Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeover. 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 635 (1989).
106. Helyar & Burrough, supra note 60, at All, col. 1.
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that coupled predictions of increased profit over the next ten years with
projections of an initial increase in capital spending, from $1.1 billion in
1988 to $1.7 billion in 1989, followed by a decline in capital spending to
$735 million in 1998.107 Prior to the LBO contest, moreover, the com-
pany's Nabisco operation lagged behind competitors in modernizing its
facilities and reformulating its cookie and cracker products to replace
lard and tropical oils with unsaturated fats. 10 8 On the tobacco front, the
profit margin from RJR's cigarette operations fell in fourth quarter of
1988, while competitor Phillip Morris's profit margin rose. 1°9 And
RJR's best-known new product in recent years, the expensively devel-
oped "smokeless cigarette" called Premier, was a failure.110 Premier cost
25% to 30% more than ordinary cigarettes, but consurfiers in test mar-
kets disliked its taste and the feel of its part-aluminum holder.' On
February 28, 1989, RJR Nabisco announced the termination of Pre-
mier's market testing and indicated that it had no immediate plans of
reintroducing Premier or anything like it.'12 The Premier venture was
not cheap; KKR reportedly told its bankers that, prior to the LBO, RJR
Nabisco's management had planned capital expenditures of $80 million
on Premier in 1989"1 and had budgeted an operating loss on Premier of
$100 million.1' 4
Like many companies that have restructured through buyouts or
leveraged recapitalizations, RJR Nabisco had a strong cash flow (that is,
cash revenues and inflows in excess of the cash outflows needed to oper-
ate its present businesses). KKR has disclosed that RJR has a projected
1989 cash flow of $4.5 billion, a financial condition that, if it continues,
can easily service and retire debt from the LBO." 5 Another common
107. Smith, Investment Bankers Should Get at Least $386.3 Million in RJR Nabisco Buy-Out,
Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1988, at A4, col. 2, col. 4.
108. Waldman, KKR Girds for Tricky Turns in Buy-Out, Wall St. J., Feb. 1, 1989, at A6, col. 1,
col. 1. In March 1989, Nabisco Brands, Inc., announced that, although it had no target date for
removing saturated fats from its products, it would attempt to do so as quickly as possible. Unit
Says Many Products Are Free of Tropical Oils, Wall St. J., Mar. 6, 1989, at B5, col. 5. Nabisco
reported that only four to six of its products still contained tropical oils, while about 60 still con-
tained lard. Id
109. Unit Says Many Products Are Free of Tropical Oils, Wall St. J., Mar. 6., 1989, at B5, col. 5.
110. Waldman, supra note 108, at A6, col. 4.
111. Waldman & Morris, RJR Nabisco Abandons "Smokeless" Cigarette, Wall St. J., Mar. 1,
1989, at Bl, col. 3, col. 5.
112. Id at Bl, col. 3.
113. Id. at Bl, col. 4. The S80 million capital spending on Premier that RJR Nabisco planned
for 1989 amounted to 4.7% of total capital spending planned for that year ($1.7 billion). See supra
text accompanying note 107.
114. Waldman & Morris, supra note 111, at Bl, col. 4.
115. White, KKR Tells Its Partners RJR Is a Bargain but Gives Them Few Numbers to Prove It,
Wall St. J., Dec, 5, 1988, at A4, col. 2, col. 3.
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explanation for the premiums paid for companies like RJR Nabisco is
improvement in the corporation's brand management-selling more
Oreos, Winstons, Milk-Bones, and other products through better market-
ing.' 1 6 Finally, after a buyout, the relationship between a company's sen-
ior managers and their financial partner in a transaction (e.g., KKR) will
differ from the prior relationship between senior management and the
company's public shareholders. Share ownership and managerial control
are no longer divided, and management becomes subject to more focused
and immediate financial accountability.' 17
Like many other restructuring transactions, the RJR Nabisco trans-
action is striking because of the identity of some of its participants and
the sources of its funding. KKR itself is an entity of relatively recent
origin, almost as recent a development as the market for junk debt securi-
ties.1 " Large amounts of capital have become available for debt financ-
ing, largely outside established markets for public offerings of debt and
equity securities. It is telling that the Federal Reserve Board, and not the
Securities and Exchange Commission, is the federal regulatory body
most closely watched in the policy debate over LBOs.1 9
The articles in this symposium address a range of issues at the
center of the legal response to fundamental corporate changes. Three of
the articles examine various concepts of financial value and devices to
enhance value in the context of such fundamental changes. As the RJR
Nabisco transaction illustrates, explanations of value and sources of
value in such transactions can be elusive. Though we know that KKR
paid $25 billion for the company, including a $12 billion premium over
the stock market's prior "valuation" of RJR Nabisco, could we ever dis-
cover the company's "true" value? And what, if anything, does "true
value" mean? Perhaps when substance appears so ineffable, the law ap-
propriately focuses on process-on the quality of the decisionmaking
that governs pricing rather than prices themselves. In Fairness Opinions:
116. See The Year of the Brand, THE ECONOMIsT, Dec. 24, 1988, at 95. Especially in the food
industry, which has in recent years become more product-competitive than price-competitive, cap-
turing strong brands assures shelf space in retail food stores and thus market share. See Cheese
Whizz; THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 22, 1988, at 74, 75.
117. See Waldman, New iJR Chief Faces a Daunting Challenge at Debt-Heavy Firm, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 14, 1989, at Al, col. 6.
118. See generally Loomis, Buyout Kings FORTUNE, July 4, 1988, at 52 (discussing KKR's
origins and operations).
119. See Man ofthe New Year, THE EcoNoMIST, Jan. 7, 1989, at 13, 14 ("For the Fed, the S&Ls
and the LBOs make an ironic couple of concerns."). But see Ricks, SEC Staff Weighs Stronger
Requirements For Disclosure by Buy-Out Participantm Wall St. J., Dec. 22, 1988, at A4, col. 2 (SEC
Chairman to testify that staff is considering extending the disclosure required in any takeover involv-
ing management participants to make disclosure equivalent to that required in going-private
transactions).
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How Fair Are They And What Can Be Done About It?, Professor Lucian
Bebchuk and Mr. Marcel Kahan describe the central role of investment
bankers' fairness opinions in corporate control transactions.120 Directors
commonly rely on such opinions when approving transactions that they
support or denouncing ones that they oppose (like hostile takeover bids).
Professor Bebchuk and Mr. Kahan demonstrate, however, that fairness
is difficult to measure and that a definition of "fairness" or "adequacy" is
unavoidably problematic. 12' Moreover, the fee structure for compensat-
ing investment banks that write fairness opinions- especially the use of
consummation-contingent fees-and investment banks' desire to enhance
future business, combined with the fact that management decides which
investment banks to hire, cause banks to "write the fairness opinions that
managers wish to see."' 122 In this respect, the RJR Nabisco transaction
was unusual, because "management" was not monolithic or single-
minded; the outside directors' interests were clearly differentiated from
those of Mr. Johnson and his bidding group.
Professor Bebchuk and Mr. Kahan argue that courts should be alert
to these problems when adjudicating cases that involve directors' reliance
on fairness opinions. These authors advocate deliberate judicial attention
to whether an investment bank, in preparing its opinion, used a definition
of fairness appropriate to the transaction at issue.123 They recommend
that courts discount opinions written by banks compensated through
contingent fee arrangements.124 They further suggest that courts, in
evaluating the reasonableness of directors' reliance on a fairness opinion,
consider whether the bank informed directors of a range of fair prices
and whether the bank's assumptions were reasonable.' 25 In Delaware, at
least, these criteria seem susceptible of easy incorporation into courts'
assessments of whether directors acted within "the bounds of reasonable
judgment"'126 after informing themselves "of all material information
reasonably available to them."'127
The operative definition of "fairness" also plays an important and
problematic role in the context of an appraisal remedy, which requires
courts to determine the value of dissenting shares following a merger or
120. Bebchuk & Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About
It 1989 DuLE L.J. 27.
121. Id. at 30-36.
122. Id. at 42.
123. Id. at 46-47.
124. Id. at 49.
125. Id. at 47-48.
126. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) r 94,194, at 91,713 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
127. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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other control transaction. In Rejecting the Minority Discount, the note
writer critically assesses the setting of valuation standards in judicial
practice, focusing in particular on some courts' practice of reducing the
pro rata value of shares held by a minority shareholder who lacks power
to control a corporation's policy and operations. 128 To be sure, many of
the explanations for the massive premium that KKR paid to RJR
Nabisco shareholders turn on KKR's ultimate control of the company's
business policy and assets. These explanations, however, may simply not
apply to judicial interpretation of statutory provisions governing ap-
praisal. The Note argues that judges have difficulty in appropriately
quantifying minority discounts and, more generally, justifying the use of
such a discount in any coherent fashion. In the absence of such a justifi-
cation, the minority discount is untenable.
The operative definition of "value" is often the price that a buyer
has paid for an asset. In contested corporate control transactions, the
appropriate role of a target's directors has long been the subject of litiga-
tion and more theoretical disputes. Should the directors do nothing?
Should they attempt to cause the bidder to pay more than it would other-
wise? May they act to defeat a bid? These questions currently arise in
the debate over the adoption and use of "poison pills," which are securi-
ties or rights to purchase securities designed to deter hostile bids. In
Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, Professor Charles M. Yablon ex-
amines the role of poison pills in facilitating settlements between bidders
and managers of target companies; such settlements convert transactions
that commence as hostile tender offers into negotiated acquisitions. 129
Professor Yablon explains that both a bidder's and a target's manage-
ment have incentives to settle prior to final judicial resolution of their
disputes in order to remove their respective risks of downside loss. 130
Litigation of such disputes presently focuses on whether target directors
have an obligation to redeem the securities constituting a poison pill. A
pill, in effect, extends the time over which any given takeover contest will
run, arguably enhancing the likelihood that higher offers will emerge. In
Delaware, where the bulk of such litigation takes place, Professor Yablon
discerns not increased certainty in judicial decisions, but, if anything, a
movement toward greater judicial discretion and uncertainty.131 Dela-
ware's applicable legal standards are "loose" criteria like "reasonable-
ness" and "proportionality," 32 which courts apply in fact-specific ways
128. Note, Rejecting the Minority Discount; 1989 DUKE L.J. 258.
129. Yablon, Poison Pills and Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54.
130. Id at 66-68.
131. Id at 76-77.
132. Id. at 73.
VoL 1989:1]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
without isolating specific dispositive factors. Even cases that clarify the
law in one respect confuse it in another, engendering factual inquiries
about new issues in subsequent cases. Professor Yablon argues that the
resultant uncertainty is, on balance, both inevitable and desirable. In
particular, he argues that motion practice before a judge or chancellor
provides an appropriate forum for the decision whether a pill should be
redeemed and the auction for a company thereby terminated. 33
Poison pills are not, of course, the only area of development in Dela-
ware law at the moment. The applicable standard for directors' decisions
to end an auction is also uncertain. In shareholder litigation challenging
such a decision in the context of the RJR Nabisco transaction, the chan-
cery court acknowledged that the precise nature of the directors' duty in
the auction context is unresolved. 134 One might view that duty as an
extension or application of the directors' general duty to act in good
faith, with loyalty, and with due care.135 An alternative view is that the
directors' duty in the auction setting, distinct from their general duty to
act in good faith and with due care, amounts to a duty to conduct a fair
or effective auction. 136 Under the first view, a court examines whether
the directors acted with due care and in a good faith effort to achieve an
appropriate objective. 37 Under the alternative view, which operates like
a form of strict liability, the court examines whether, after the fact and
without regard to the board's good faith, the auction was fair or, perhaps,
effective. 3  In its May 1989 opinion in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmil-
lan, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court characterized these apparent di-
133. Id. at 87-88.
134. See In re RJR Nabisco Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCII) r 94,194, at 91,714-15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989). The chancery court attributed its uncer-
tainty on this point to the limitations of the Supreme Court's bench ruling in a case about manage-
ment's auction-related decisions, see Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) r 94,072, at 91,025 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 1988) (in auction for sale of
corporate enterprise, there must be "the most scrupulous adherence to ordinary principles of fair-
ness"), rev'd, [Current Transfer Binder] id. € 94,401, at 92,602 (Del. May 3, 1989). In re RIR
Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,715.
135. See id; accord In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781-84 (Del. Ch.
1988) (auction does not require "level playing field" if directors act with care and in good faith
pursuit of shareholders' interests).
136. See In re RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,714;
accord In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) r 94,181, at 91,644 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988) ("Even if the Board thought it was acting in
good faith, the sale process itself was so substantially flawed that the Board's actions, considering all
the facts and circumstances, were not likely to have maximized the value of the corporation for its
shareholders and, therefore, its actions cannot be viewed as being rational.").
137. See In re RJR Nabisco, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 91,714-15.
138. See 1d. at 91,714. Even if an "effective" auction is required. the court held that boards need
not conduct perfect auctions to escape liability. Id. at 91,715.
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vergences as "more a matter of semantics than substance."' 39 The court
held in Mills that directors' decisions incident to conducting and con-
cluding an auction should have as their "primary objective, and essential
purpose, ... the enhancement of the bidding process for the benefit of the
stockholders."' 40 Directors who treat bidders unequally must establish
that they had a rational basis for the action, founded in the shareholders'
interests,14' and that their actions were reasonable in relation to the end
sought.142 The facts reviewed in the Mills opinion illustrated a flawed
bidding process in which a management-sponsored bidding group re-
ceived tactical advantages not available to other bidders (including dis-
closure of another party's bid). The Supreme Court held that the
directors had failed to exercise their "active and direct duty of over-
sight," a failure that significantly contributed to the mismanagement of
the auction. 43
In recent years, Delaware law on directors' fiduciary obligation to a
corporation and its shareholders has evolved to subject directors to af-
firmative duties, which directors can breach even if they act disinterest-
edly. To this extent, directors as fiduciaries resemble other types of
fiduciaries, like trustees and guardians, whose positions are convention-
ally held to impart affirmative obligations. In Smith v. Van Gorkom, a
1985 case involving a proposed LBO, the Delaware Supreme Court inter-
preted the directors' duty of care to require that "directors inform[]
themselves as to all information that was reasonably available to them,"
including the basis on which an acquisition price was computed. 144
Later in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. that directors confronted with a takeover bid had an obli-
gation to determine whether the bid was in the best interests of the cor-
poration and its shareholders.1 45 Directors also have a related obligation
to protect the corporation and its shareholders "from perceived harm
whether a threat originates from third parties or other shareholders." 14
Indeed, the Unocal court observed that directors have a duty to "ensure
that the minority stockholders receive equal value for their shares," at
least when an offeror proposes a transaction that compels an exchange of
139. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) Ir 94,401, at 92,602 (Del. May 3, 1989).
140. I d at 92,601.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 92,602.
143. Id at 92,597
144. 488 A.2d 858, 877 (Del. 1985).
145. 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). For a discussion of the potential significance of Unocal, see
Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review? 44 Bus. LAw. 247 (1989).
146. Id at 955.
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some shares for junk debt. 147 Under Unocal, the directors' duty to pro-
tect requires that protective means be "reasonable" or proportional to
the threat. 148 In Mills, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly made this
standard applicable to directors' decisions during an auction. 149 Finally,
as Professor Yablon's article explores at length, directors in particular
circumstances may come under an affirmative duty to redeem a poison
pill.
This judicial invigoration of the directors' role is relatively recent.
In 1968, a leading academic wrote that he was "very skeptical of the
proposition that directors of industrial corporations run any substantial
risk of liability for ordinary negligence," uncomplicated by self-deal-
ing.150 To be sure, it is awkward at best to characterize the more recently
enunciated duties as an obligation not to be negligent,15' and only
slightly less awkward to treat them as particular manifestations of the
directors' obligation to act with due care. Both formulations--"avoid
negligence" and "use due care"-address how directors discharge their
duties, and not the affirmative content of those duties.
Consider, in contrast, the legal position of a trustee. In addition to a
duty of loyalty, which requires a trustee to administer a trust solely in the
beneficiary's interest, 152 and a duty to use skill and care in doing so,'53
the trustee has many affirmative duties. For example, the trustee must,
using reasonable skill and care, preserve the trust property. 5 4 If the
trust has two or more beneficiaries, the trustee must deal impartially with
all of them.'"5 Moreover, if the trustee can reasonably perform her du-
ties personally, she may not delegate them. 56 Directors, of course, are
not entirely like trustees in their legal obligations,' 57 but the recent devel-
opments in Delaware law give directors affirmative duties like those ap-
plicable to trustees. In the midst of such evolution, it can be difficult to
distinguish between legal developments and legal uncertainty.
147. Id at 957.
148. Id at 955.
149. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,601-02.
150. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. 1078, 1101 (1968).
151. But see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (holding that "concept of
gross negligence" is applicable test to determine whether directors' business judgment was
informed).
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (1959).
153. Id. § 174.
154. Id. § 176.
155. Id. § 183.
156. Id. § 171.
157. See, e.g., DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation. 1988 DUKE L.J.
879, 908-09, 909 n.136; Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality,
22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
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Two of the symposium articles focus on the impact of corporate
restructurings on nonshareholders. In any restructuring, present equi-
tyholders receive a bonus financed by substantial borrowing. As the RJR
Nabisco transaction illustrates, this additional borrowing reduces the
market value of the corporation's preexisting debt securities. In Corpo-
rate Debt Relationships Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, Pro-
fessor William W. Bratton, Jr., analyzes the differing legal conceptions of
the relationship between debtholders and corporate issuers.'58 Professor
Bratton notes debtholders' curious failure to bargain for greater contrac-
tual protection against the financial consequences of restructuring. In
the mid-1970s, new unsecured public debt of large industrial corpora-
tions ceased to contain covenants restricting issuers' ability to incur addi-
tional debt and distribute assets to equityholders. This situation raises
the important question of what limits the law may appropriately impose
on issuers' behavior that harms creditors who could have protected
themselves by contract.
Though the bulk of RJR Nabisco's bonds contained no restrictions
addressed to the risk of a restructuring, the company had during the past
three years issued almost $500 million in Swiss-franc-denominated bonds
that gave holders the right to redeem the bonds at initial face value in the
event of a corporate reorganization.159 Two underwriters of the Swiss
franc bonds, citing stringent capital preservation norms in Swiss fiduci-
ary law, threatened to force redemption unless KKR agreed to a satisfac-
tory settlement with the bondholders.'60 Professor Bratton's article
provides a number of explanations for U.S. investors' willingness-star-
tling in retrospect-to buy debt securities without comparable restric-
tions. His article also justifies a limited regulatory role for the law (albeit
one capable of expansion). Professor Bratton rejects arguments that an
issuer owes a fiduciary obligation to debtholders, calling these arguments
"overwrought";1 61 self-protection in the market diminishes the urgency
of the bondholders' predicament.
Restructuring, nonetheless, both embodies and provokes profound
change. Long-held assumptions about management's preferences for sta-
bility and asset growth funded by retained earnings have become inaccu-
rate, destabilizing the relationships premised on them. More generally,
158. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships" Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring 1989
DuKE LJ. 92.
159. Winkler, Two Underwriters Demand RJR Call Swiss Franc Bond, Wall St. J., Feb. 7, 1989,
at Cl, cal. 5.
160. Id at C19, col 5. In March, a Swiss court issued a temporary order to block completion of
the LBO. White, Swiss Court Seeks to Halt Takeover of RJR Nabisco, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1989, at
A19, col. 3.
161. Bratton, supra note 158, at 151.
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as Professor Bratton observes, the "restructuring movement presupposes
diminished relational solidarity."1 62 In this view, F. Ross Johnson might
not be a villain, but his obvious pursuit of a self-serving agenda defeated
others' expectations, expectations that were real although not captured in
explicit contract terms. The question of the appropriate legal response to
claims that such expectations have been disappointed is a difficult one. Is
a public-law response appropriate? If so, on behalf of what categories of
claimants, and on what terms? Should the law leave parties to anticipate
and allocate the risks associated with corporate restructuring and to es-
tablish appropriate contracts?
In Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal
Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, Professor Jonathan R.
Macey assesses the impact of fundamental corporate changes on a range
of non-shareholder constituencies and demonstrates the overall desirabil-
ity of private contract solutions.163 Professor Macey explains that corpo-
rate restructurings provide occasions for shareholders' opportunistic
behavior, that is, for shareholders to benefit from a firm's income stream
at the expense of other claimants. 64 Many such claimants make firm-
specific capital investments, including human capital investments, that
leave them vulnerable to exploitation. In Professor Macey's judgment, a
corporation is best viewed as a web of contractual relationships among
producers of factors necessary for a corporation's financing and opera-
tion, not as an object of claims based on property rights.1 65 Courts
should ascertain the contracts that link a corporation's constituents, ac-
knowledge that the firm's residual claimants are equity shareholders, and
police expropriation of firm-specific capital investments.'16 6 Further, Pro-
fessor Macey expresses great skepticism toward arguments founded on
"implicit" contracts among these constituents.
In the period described by Professor Bratton's article, an era of un-
foreseen change in the circumstances defining parties' expectations, the
content of parties' "implicit contracts" might be difficult to determine.
Professor Macey's article explains why persons and organizations within
the web of a firm's contractual relationships, as well as "outsiders,"
might find explicit-contract-based solutions most appropriate.1 67 The ar-
ticle specifically condemns public-law solutions-like plant-closing laws
requiring advance notice to rank-and-file workers-that operate indis-
162. Id. at 171.
163. Macey, Externalities Firm-Specific Capital Investmen and the Legal Treatment of Funda-
mental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173.
164. Id. at 188-89.
165. Id. at 179-80.
166. Id. at 180.
167. Id. at 182-88, 199-200.
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criminately and might actually inflict injury on their intended
beneficiaries.168
In the United States, the institutional context of fundamental corpo-
rate change includes significant federal regulation of securities transac-
tions. An important example is the regulation of tender offers through
the Williams Act.169 One might think of federal regulation in this area as
furnishing background rules that limit tactics that parties might other-
wise deploy in control transactions for publicly held companies. In The
Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeovers, Professor Dale A. Oesterle deals
with the short-lived but provocative phenomenon of street sweeps,170
large-scale acquisition efforts mounted on national stock exchanges or
through privately negotiated transactions. Buyers can acquire shares
quickly through a street sweep, avoiding the publicity and delay that ac-
company a general offer to buy out shareholders. Professor Oestere's
article evaluates and rejects the claim that street sweeps are inherently
exploitive; the article even explains how investors might be best served by
regulation that revitalizes rather than inhibits street sweeps.17' Professor
Oesterle points out that the SEC has given the operative term in the Wil-
liams Act, "tender offer," a broad and imprecise interpretation, thereby
chilling some types of street sweeps. 172 In addition, the combined effects
of state takeover legislation and poison pills have proved even more effec-
tive deterrents to street sweeps.' 73 The article evaluates and critiques a
variety of current proposals for regulation of sweeps, noting that the phe-
nomenon to be regulated has itself nearly died out. Professor Oesterle
argues that street sweeps are potentially less coercive to shareholders
than tender offers; he explains, however, that when a potential offeror
accomplishes a sweep, shareholders must bargain at an informational dis-
advantage.1 74 Accordingly, he suggests that state statutory regulations
and poison pills that affect sweeps can best be justified as devices that
compel a prospective bidder to disclose its intentions and bargain with
target shareholders as a group.' 75
Financially speaking, we have sailed to Byzantium.17 6 Startling
168. Id at 191-97.
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
170. Oesterle, The Rise and Fall of Street Sweep Takeoverm 1989 DUKE L.J. 202.
171. Id at 245-57.
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173. Id at 233-41.
174. Id at 243-44.
175. Id at 244-45.
176. Yeats, to be sure, was writing in an entirely different context, see W. YEATS, Sailing to
Byatidum, in COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 217 (2d ed. 1952), but the first line of the poem
("[tlhat is no country for old men," id) seems highly descriptive of today's fast-track corporate
finance.
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changes in financial practices have occurred in a relatively short period
of time, and the consequences of those changes are not confined to the
denizens of financial institutions. In particular, the availability of large
amounts of debt financing, on terms attractive to present or prospective
corporate managers, has resulted in a dramatic restructuring of many
major firms. In many respects, the law's response to these developments
has a tentative quality. It is yet to be seen whether a financial Byzantium
will prove stable and desirable in the long run.
